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International and Domestic Information
Systems On the International Oil Market
REINIER H.J.H. LoCK*
INTRODUCTION
The 1973 world oil crisis, generated largely by the OAPEC
oil embargo, raised anew the question of what role the United
States government should play in the international oil market.
This question has concerned U.S. policymakers ever since the
large scale entry of U.S. companies into the international oil
market in the late 1920's.1 Perhaps the most concerted effort
to assert a U.S. government presence took place during World
War II, when Harold Ickes, then Secretary of the Interior, led
unsuccessful efforts to purchase major Arabian oil concessions
from U.S. companies for a government "Petroleum Reserve
Corporation" and to build a government-owned trans-Arabia
pipeline.2
Despite this concern, the U.S. based oil companies have
conducted their international dealings in virtually a political
vacuum. The government has had little knowledge of, let alone
control over, their international negotiations and operations.
They have appeared to conduct diplomacy and "foreign pol-
icy" almost as independent states, except at certain, often crit-
ical times, when they actively sought government support for
their international initiatives. Consultation with the govern-
ment, when it did take place, was often initiated by the compa-
nies, very much on their terms, and it seldom allowed the gov-
ernment time to act independently.
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Energy. B.
Com., 1964, Rhodes University, South Africa; LL.B., 1966, Rhodes University, South
Africa; B.C.L., 1969, Oxford University; LL.M., 1977, University of California (Boalt),
Berkeley.
1. See generally SAMPSON, THE SEVEN SISTERS, Ch. 4 (1975); BLAIR, THE CONTROL
OF OIL, 31 et. seq. (1976).
2. SAMPSON, supra note 1, at 94-99.
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The 1973 crisis revealed that inadequate information
would probably have rendered most government initiatives in-
effective, even, if it had desired or possessed the legal mecha-
nisms to assert its presence or influence more directly into the
negotiations between U.S. oil companies and the OPEC pro-
ducing countries.
The critical need for an adequate, intelligent, governmen-
tal decisionmaking information base, irrespective of whether
the government should play a greater role in, or seek to regu-
late, U.S. oil companies' foreign activities, had become obvious
on both the domestic and international levels. In November
1974, most major Western industrialized nations (and Japan)
concluded, under the auspices of the OECD, the Agreement on
the International Energy Program (IEP Agreement)3 in an ef-
fort to counter the new assertion of concerted power by OPEC.
THE IEP AGREEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
The IEP Agreement called for, inter alia, "a more active
role in relation to the oil industry by establishing a comprehen-
sive international information system and permanent frame-
work for consultation with oil companies."' The Agreement
established a two-part Information System:5 a "General Sec-
tion on the situation in the international oil market and activi-
ties of oil companies;" and the "Special Section" which is to
ensure efficient operation of the emergency preparedness mea-
sures which comprise a substantial portion of the treaty.6 Both
sections are coordinated through the Secretariat of the Interna-
tional Energy Agency (IEA), the organization created by the
OECD in November 1974 to implement the Agreement's provi-
sions. Policy under the Agreement is developed by "standing
groups," consisting of representatives of nation signatories in
certain functional areas. The Standing Group on the Oil Mar-
ket (SOM) is the primary functionary for the General Section.
Under the General Section, participating countries are
required to report, on a regular basis, "precise data" identified
by SOM and approved by the IEA's Management Committee,'
3. Agreement on an International Energy Program, done at Paris, November 18,
1974, T.I.A.S. No. 8278, 27 U.S.T. 1685 [hereinafter cited as IEP Agreement].
4. TEP Agreement, Preamble.
5. Id. art. 25.
6. An interesting critical analysis of the IEP Agreement, in particular its emer-
gency preparedness provisions, is contained in Willrich and Conant, The International
Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 199 (1977).
7. IEP Agreement, art. 29.
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on specific subjects relating to oil companies operating within
their jurisdiction. These subjects include corporate and finan-
cial structure, crude oil production rates, stocks, acquisition
costs and prices, allocation of crude oil supplies, terms of access
to supplies, and capital investments." Most of this data is ob-
tained by the governments from their oil companies. The iden-
tification of data required is an ongoing SOM function which
is still in relatively early development.' In pursuance of this
function, SOM is required to consult with companies to make
certain that the system is "compatible with industry opera-
tions" and to develop standards and procedures to harmonize
data reporting and ensure its confidentiality."
The data reported is used by both the IEA and participat-
ing countries to assist their national energy planning. However,
much of the data reported is treated confidentially by the IEA
and in a form that will avoid disclosures of "proprietary""
company information or information that might impair compe-
tition within the oil industry. 2 Elaborate procedures have been
adopted to avoid disclosure of proprietary company-specific
data. Most of the data is transferred to the IEA in aggregate,
noncompany-specific form: most of the data received from the
IEA by the U.S. government is classified as national security
sensitive. 3 Only certain types of data are obtained through
systematic reporting. For other types, such as terms of access
to crude supplies, company supply and demand appraisals,
industry structure, and exploration prospects, SOM has devel-
oped a system of regular, formal consultations with individual
oil companies.
Both the General Information System and the emergency
8. Id. art. 27. The list is not exhaustive, and it may be expanded by the lEA's
Governing Board. Id. art. 27(1)(j).
9. Id. art. 31.
10. Id. art. 30.
11. The term is construed quite narrowly in article 28 as being limited to such
matters as patents, trademarks, scientific processes, geological data, individual sales,
and tax returns.
12. Article 27(3) requires that participating countries report "on a nonproprietary
basis" and in a way that will "not prejudice competition" or undermine its laws
protecting competition.
13. To meet current classification standards, the data must be such that its unau-
thorized disclosure could cause identifiable damage to the national security. Exec.
Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Most information received from IEA
could be classified as "foreign government information" which, under § 1-303 of Exec.
Order No. 12,065, is presumed to cause such identifiable damage.
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preparedness activities under the IEP Agreement rely heavily
on oil company cooperation for their successful implementa-
tion. Although almost as an afterthought in the IEP Agree-
ment, the General Section information system and its mecha-
nisms for consultations with companies may, ironically, prove
to be one of the more solid achievements of the Agreement.
The IEA has already developed reporting systems on the
prices and acquisition costs of crude oil imports. It also receives
data on stocks and production. Generally, reporting as to crude
prices and acquisition costs has been confined to OPEC "crude
streams," defined by oil gravity and country and usually coin-
cident with supplier countries. Theoretically, however, Article
27 is broad enough to authorize reporting on any crude stream.
The role of SOM and other IEA organs in developing these
reporting systems could make them important instruments of
IEA policy.
U.S. GOVERNMENT REPORTING SYSTEMS
To meet the information shortcomings exposed by the 1973
crisis as well as the more specific requirements of the IEP Infor-
mation System, DOE and its predecessor FEA, have developed
a group of extensive reporting systems by U.S. based oil com-
panies on their international crude oil dealings. When suitably
linked, these reports should provide DOE with the ongoing,
comprehensive information base necessary for meaningful
analysis of the state and direction of the international oil mar-
ket essential for effective policy formulation. They also will
contribute to fulfillment of IEA obligations and certain domes-
tic statutory and regulatory requirements.
Two existing reporting systems, the Foreign Crude Oil
Cost Report," and the Transfer Pricing Report, 15 will soon be
significantly augmented by a third system, the Foreign Oil
Supply Agreement Report (FOSA).
The Foreign Crude Oil Cost Report (EIA-67) contains data
on the cost of foreign crude oil acquisitions by U.S. based com-
panies and on the volume of exports from producing countries
to the United States. The information on crude oil costs is
provided to the IEA under Article 27 of the IEP Agreement.
The obligation is imposed upon firms who acquire 100,000 bar-
14. DOE Form EIA-67 (formerly FEA-P-328-Q-O),
15. DOE Form ERA-51 (formerly FEA-F-701-M-O).
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rels or more of crude oil per day from countries who are not IEA
members. Reporting is geared to the IEA's classification of
crude streams. Reports on a contract-by-contract basis can be
readily linked with the contract details provided by FOSA re-
ports.
The FOSA Report (form EIA-27) should provide the most
significant information about foreign oil operations. Reporting
is imposed on any U.S. entity which has a right to lift for export
certain volumes 6 of crude oil in foreign countries. 7 These enti-
ties are required to report all material terms of their contracts
or agreements with foreign producer governments or entities
controlled by them, such as national oil companies. Certain
specified details are also required: prices, fees for services,
other payments to the host government, minimum and maxi-
mum lifting rights, and government imposed production lim-
its. 8 Contracts and other related documents must be produced
if required by DOE. 9 In addition, companies are required to
notify DOE of negotiations with producer governments which
might "reasonably lead to the establishment of any supply
arrangement" covered in section 215.3.21 DOE can obtain fur-
ther details through consultation with the reporting company.
Hence, some potential for an early warning system on impend-
ing negotiations is built into the FOSA regulations.
Many comments on the proposed regulation received from
potentially affected oil companies argued against a reporting
requirement and urged, instead, a continuation and augmenta-
tion of the voluntary consultations that had taken place period-
ically with the government. DOE concluded that such consul-
tations would not ensure the systematic, current, and ongoing
information base necessary for well-informed policy formula-
tion and timely decisions in the international oil supply area.
However, DOE is encouraging continuation of the voluntary
consultation process to facilitate its understanding of the inter-
national oil situation and sharpen the perceptions of both the
companies and the government.
16. 150,000 barrels per day average for a year, or a total of 55 million barrels in
less than a year, or a total of 150 million barrels over the lifetime of the agreement.
17. Final rulemaking entitled Collection of Foreign Oil Supply Agreement Infor-
mation, 10 C.F.R. § 215 (1978).
18. 10 C.F.R. § 215.3 (1978).
19. 10 C.F.R. § 215.4 (1978).
20. 10 C.F.R. § 215.6 (1978).
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The central concern of most potentially affected (respon-
dent) companies has been the protection of confidential infor-
mation reported under the FOSA system. A significant portion
of the data reported will probably be either "proprietary" or
national security sensitive, or both. One approach to ensure
confidentiality would be for DOE to classify such data as meets
the standards for national security classification under Execu-
tive Order 12,065. This order limits access to persons within the
government to the classified information who are deemed
"trustworthy," i.e., possessing the requisite security clearance,
and who can establish that "access is necessary for the per-
formance of official duties."
'2'
Access within the government to "proprietary" informa-
tion, that is, information regarded as confidential for essen-
tially commercial-competitive reasons, could, under current
law, be limited to those persons who require such access to
fulfill their official duties.
Access may be denied to the public at large under section
552(b)(4) of the Freedom of Information Act, which exempts
"trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential" from the
Act's coverage. 2
To enhance these protections given to FOSA, DOE will
impose carefully controlled limitations on access within the
government to, and detailed procedures for the handling of,
FOSA information classified under Executive Order 12,065, or
information which is determined to be "proprietary.
'2: 3
The Transfer Pricing Report form (ERA-51) is designed to
collect information on transfer prices, those assigned to im-
ported oil between U.S. companies and their foreign trading
affiliates, and on crude oil transactions between nonaffiliated
entities. This information is required to administer adequately
the application to refiners of DOE's Mandatory Petroleum
21. Section 4-101 of Exec. Order No. 12,065, 43 Fed. Reg. 28,957 (1978). Access
may be denied to the public at large under § 552(b)(1) of the Freedom of Information
Act, which exempts matters properly "kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy" under criteria established by an Executive order. 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1) (1976).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976).
23. An indication of the kinds of procedures that will be adopted with respect to
proprietary information under the Freedom of Information Act is included in a recent
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking with respect to DOE's proposed FOI regulations. 43
Fed. Reg. 40,530, at 40,536.
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Price Regulations. These requirements impose price ceilings on
certain petroleum products based on crude oil costs." Transfer
pricing information also is provided to the IEA under the IEP
Agreement.
The obligation to report is imposed on a monthly basis
upon refiners importing at least 500,000 barrels of crude, or any
crude from a foreign affiliate in that month. Although ERA-51
is limited to refiners, it does provide data similar to that gath-
ered under EIA-67 and the FOSA system but from a somewhat
different perspective. This report, therefore, helps DOE moni-
tor certain cost and price movements, both within the United
States and internationally, and enhances DOE's analytical
capabilities.
Between the essentially interlocking EIA-67 and FOSA
systems, and the additional information provided by ERA-51,
a substantial data base can be provided. It can be supple-
mented further, if necessary, by the monthly Report of Oil
Imports into the U.S. and Puerto Rico designed primarily to
facilitate implementation of the Oil Imports Program. 5 The
obligation to report details, such as volume and port of entry,
are imposed on oil companies which import crude oil, residual
fuel oil, or finished petroleum products.
The legal authority for imposition of all three major sets
of reporting requirements described above lies in section 13(b)
of the Federal Energy Administration Act (FEAA), as
amended:
All persons owning or operating facilities or business prem-
ises who are engaged in any phase of energy supply or major
energy consumption shall make available to the Administrator
such information and periodic reports, records, documents, and
other data, relating to the purposes of this chapter, including full
identification of all data and projections as to source, time and
methodology of development, as the Administrator may pre-
scribe by regulation or order as necessary or appropriate for the
proper exercise of functions under this chapter. "
24. Mandatory Petroleum Price Regulations, 10 C.F.R. § 212 (1978). Section
212.84 prescribes standards for establishing the cost of crude oil imports in transactions
between affiliated entities. Basically, an effort is made to emulate the price such
entities would charge if they were dealing at arm's-length, § 212.84(c). DOE estab-
lishes representative arm's-length prices, compares these with the companies' reported
transfer prices, and disallows crude costs attributable to excessive transfer prices.
25. DOE Form ERA-60 (formerly FEA-P1l3-M-O) [19771 3 EN. MNGM'T (CCH)
18,413, which in 1977 consolidated and replaced three earlier reporting forms. See
42 Fed. Reg. 4,889 (1977) for the announcement of the availability of this form.
26. 11 U.S.C. § 772(b) (1976). The data gathering authority is now vested in the
1979
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All three reporting systems patently meet the require-
ments that they relate to the broad purposes of the FEAA and
that they are "necessary or appropriate" to the exercise of the
Secretary's functions thereunder. For instance, the Secretary's
general functions in the execution of his authority under sec-
tion 5(b) include the collection and analysis of information on
energy demand, production, and reserves, the development of
a comprehensive energy policy and energy trade policies, inte-
grating domestic and foreign energy supply policies, promoting
stability in energy prices, and developing plans and programs
for dealing with energy production shortages.17 Furthermore,
quite specific authority for much of the information sought lies
in section 15 of the FEAA, which imposes on DOE the require-
ment to report annually in considerable detail on specified en-
ergy matters to Congress and the President. 8
Detailed information on the financial performance of all
U.S. based energy companies will be obtained from the energy
company financial report system (FRS) (DOE Form EIA-28),
authorized by section 13(b) of the FEAA and specifically man-
dated by section 205(h) of the Department of Energy Organiza-
tion Act. 9 These provisions require, inter alia, that the FRS
yield information on energy company operations segregated
"by energy source and geographic area. ,30 Under this mandate,
DOE will collect data to compare foreign and domestic finan-
cial performance, sources and uses of cash, investments, rela-
tive performance, revenue, cost and profit differences, and in-
vestment in major foreign regions. Apart from specific interna-
tional data, the FRS will yield a wide variety of detailed infor-
mation in areas such as competition and energy supply and
development. This information could provide an important
complement to the other information systems discussed. To-
gether they should soon provide a relatively comprehensive in-
formation base, especially if effectively linked with the IEA
system, for informed decisionmaking.
Administrator of the Energy Information Administration of DOE by virtue of section
205(c) of the Department of Energy Organization Act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(c)(Supp.
1977). The functions of the former Administrator of the FEA are now vested in the
Secretary of DOE by virtue of section 301(a) of this act. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,151(a)(Supp.
1977).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 764(b)(1976).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 774 (1976).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(Supp. 1977).
30. 42 U.S.C.A. § 7,135(h)(2)(C)(Supp. 1977).
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